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MARBURY v. MADISON AND EUROPEAN UNION
"CONSTITUTIONAL" REVIEW
GEORGE

I.

A.

BERMANN*

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison' specifically raises the question of the legitimacy of a "horizontal" species of judicial review, that is, review by courts of the exercise of
powers by the coordinate branches of government. The same
question could be asked with respect to judicial review in the European Union. More particularly, how problematic or contestable
has "horizontal"judicial review been within the European Union as
a matter of principle? And, irrespective of its contestability, how
have the courts of the European Union exercised "horizontal"
review? We will find, however, that it is not the "horizontal" dimension of judicial review, with which Marbuy is associated, but rather
its "vertical" dimension, that has generated larger questions of
principle within the E.U. constitutional system, giving rise to serious doubts as to its exercise.
II.

"VERTICAL" REVIEW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Controversy over the principle of vertical judicial review within
the United States has become relatively muted. The U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause 2 has gone a long way toward securing
acceptance of the legitimacy in principle of federal court review of
the federal constitutionality of statelegislation. This is not to say that
the principle has not been contested. Names such as John C. Calhoun 3 and milestones such as the Kentucky4 and Virginia Resolutions 5 demonstrate as much. But the day has long since passed
* Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law and Walter Gellhom Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School. B.A. 1967,J.D. 1971, Yale University; LL.M. 1975, Columbia
Law School. Professor Bermann is a member of the New York bar, as well as the bars for
the Southern District of New York, Eastern District of New York, and U.S. Supreme Court.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI cl.2.
3. See generally IRVING H. BARTLETT, JOHN C. CALHOUN: A BIOGRAPHY (1993).
4.
JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND
THE Epic STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 58-59 (2002).
5. Id. at 59-60.
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when the principle of federal court review of the federal constitutionality of state legislation is challenged as a matter of constitutional principle. Such dispute as there is-and it is at times hottends to be over the workings and intensity of that review, and over
the specific constitutional reasoning on the basis of which state legislation is on occasion found to run afoul of the federal
Constitution.
By comparison, judicial review's vertical, or federalist, dimension
reveals truly serious "fault lines" within the European Union. This
should not surprise us. If the European Union's core purpose is
the pervasively programmatic one of market integration-the free
movement of the factors of production: goods, persons, services
and capital 6-then infringing State measures simply cannot be
allowed to stand, but neither can State courts realistically be relied
upon to invalidate them. To appreciate this point, we in the
United States would have to imagine the "dormant commerce
clause" lying at the core of American constitutionalism, and ask
whether state courts could be counted on to vindicate it. Only if
that were that the case, would we find ourselves in a situation
broadly comparable to the E.U. situation with regard to vertical
federalism.
When we examine the substance of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 7 we cannot help but observe that much of
the stuff of that treaty consists of limitations on Member State law
and policy vis-A.-vis the principles of European market integration.
The treaty also establishes fairly precise formulas for determining if
and when Member State-imposed obstacles to intra-Community
trade are tolerable.8 Market integration is so central to the European enterprise that the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) read into
the Treaty of Rome a full-scale supremacy clause at its first
opportunity. 9
As a vertical integration project, the European Union is of
course far the better model than the United States for the emerging regime of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The jurisprudence of the WTO panels and Appellate Body is very much a
matter of determining the extent to which the scope of policymak6. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 451
(2d ed. 2002).
7. CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
8. See id. arts. 28-30 (goods), 39 (workers), 43-46, 49-54 (services and establishment),
56-60 (capital).
9. See Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
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ing freedom that previously sovereign states once enjoyed is now to
be curtailed in pursuance of the free trade and market integration
policies central to the WTO regime.10
This brings me to the question of the exercise of vertical judicial
review within the European Union. An examination of the jurisprudence of the ECJ shows that, while there have been, as in most
federal systems, various "swings of the pendulum," allegedly discriminatory or protectionist state measures have been subject not
only to constitutional scrutiny, but to serious constitutional scrutiny.
Even after the ECJ finds that a Member State has invoked a legitimate state interest in defense of trade-inhibiting legislation, the
State may have to justify that measure by reference to a broad and
potentially demanding proportionality analysis.1 1 This proportionality analysis may require, at the extreme, a showing that the disputed measure satisfies a least drastic means test 1 2 long associated
in the United States with vindication of only the most precious of
individual constitutional rights. The proportionality principle permits close judicial scrutiny even of measures adopted by Member
States in the name of "overriding" or "paramount" requirements of
13
a "mandatory" nature.
This is not to say that strict scrutiny in E.U. law knows no limitations. The ECJ's Keck jurisprudence, for example, carves out an
exception according to which the ECJ will not examine the proportionality of State measures that only potentially and indirectly
affect intra-Community trade. 14 The ECJ's manifestly deferential
case law includes another exception applicable when Member
States seek to justify state measures by reference to national interests of a public morality character. 15 Furthermore, established case
law shows that, once Member States have legislatively harmonized
certain policies at the Community level, the possibility of justifying
6
national measures on the basis of those policies diminishes.'
The pattern that I have described is in an important sense paradoxical. That which is most essential to the achievement of the
10.

MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

LAW, PRACTICE,

126-28 (2003).
Case 124/81, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 203, 236 (UHT Milk

AND POLICY

11.
Case).
12. Id.
13. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227 (German Beer Case).
14. Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck v. Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, 16131.
15. Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn, 1979 E.C.R. 3795, 3813.
16. See, e.g., Case 5/77, Tedeschi v. Denkavit, 1977 E.C.R. 1555, 1576-77.
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paramount Community mission-viz, assuring the conformity of
national law with overriding market integration values-by its
nature requires a potentially objectionable erosion of State sovereignty. It is for this reason that, while the basic principle of
supremacy of European over national law has largely gone uncontested, the more precise notions of direct applicability and direct
effect, which are essential to realizing that supremacy, have proven,
17
historically at least, to be somewhat more contested.
The E.U. law system mitigates this contestability in various ways.
By and large, the ECJ never invalidates a Member State measure as
such; rather, at most, the ECJ declares the measure's incompatibility with E.U. law, and leaves to Member State administrations, and
ultimately Member State courts, the obligation to draw the appropriate substantive and remedial inferences.1 8 The ECJ's review is
most often mediated by the reference of "preliminary questions"' 9
by Member State courts before which questions of E.U. law may
arise. The right of national courts to make and formulate preliminary references to the ECJ, and their right to determine how the
resulting preliminary rulings will be given effect in the national
court proceedings out of which they arose, strongly empowers
those courts in the E.U. adjudicatory process.
On the other hand, the ECJ has understandably refused to give
national courts the "last word" on the adequacy of the national law
remedies that Member State courts use to vindicate E.U. law-based
claims. Understandably, a formidable body of case law has arisen
in which the ECJ requires national courts to use non-discriminatory and minimally adequate remedies in adjudicating E.U. lawbased claims. Non-discriminatory remedies are those which are
available under other Member States' laws for comparable violations, and at the same time at least "minimally adequate" for purposes of protecting the E.U. legal rights being asserted. 20 The
remedial pressures on Member States and their courts have operated as an important counterweight in the system.
This corrective produces its own paradox. Precisely because
Member State courts are the linchpin of the system, the ECJ has
taken an exceptional, and some might say unhealthy, interest in
17. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 163212 (2d ed. 1998).
18. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 441.
19. EC TREArY, supra note 7, art. 234.
20. Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ffir
das Saarland,
1976 E.C.R. 1989.
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scrutinizing the adequacy of Member State administrative and judicial remedies. In contrast to domestic law-based claims, the ECJ
will scrutinize the adequacy of a Member State remedy for a Community law-based claim even when the national courts apply the
remedy in a non-discriminatory fashion. This remedialadequacy case
law has addressed such matters as the availability of certain remedies (such as constitutional review of national legislation contrary
to E.U. law, 21 provisional relief in connection with E.U.-based challenges to national law, 22 and a damages remedy for national violations of Community law2 3 ) and the acceptability of limits on the
exercise of E.U. law-based claims (such as standing rules, 24 statutes
27
26
of limitations, 25 damages ceilings, and defenses such as waiver

and abuse of rights28 ).
III.

"HORIZONTAL" REVIEW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

While the vertical dimension of judicial review is thus highly
problematic within the European Union, its horizontal dimension-the dimension largely represented by Marbuy-is considerably less problematic. We observe this distinction from the very face
of the Community Treaties. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, E.C.
Treaty articles expressly vest the ECJ with authority to review the
legality of acts of E.U. institutions. 29 They also identify which categories of plaintiffs have standing to seek review, and on which
grounds and within what time period.3 0 Originally, the institutional plaintiffs included the Commission and the Council, with
the European Parliament initially having nothing more than a
21. See, e.g., Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629.
22. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433, 1-2465.
23. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5414.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1-5407-13.
25. See, e.g., Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG, 1976 E.C.R. at 1999.
26. See, e.g., Case C-271/91, Marshall v. Southampton & S.W. Hampshire Area Health
Auth., 1993 E.C.R. 1-4367, 14412.
27. See, e.g., Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, 1999
E.C.R. 1-3055, 1-3094-95.
28. See, e.g., Case C-441/93, Pafitis v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E., 1996 E.C.R. I1347, 1-1359.
29. EC TREArTY, supra note 7, art. 230. The original article also gave standing, under
certain circumstances, to private parties. Under the current version of Article 230, standing
is also enjoyed by the European Parliament and, within certain limits, the Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank.
30. Id.
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purely consultative role in the legislative process. 31 Interestingly,
neither of these institutional plaintiffs offers any kind of presumptive majoritarianor popular advantage, much less a democratic surplus.
The Commission, after all, is bureaucratic in form and executive in
function3 2 ; the Council consists by definition of national government ministers3 3 entirely capable of acting in a way antithetical to
the preferences of the E.U.'s popular majority, not to mention to
the Community interest.
The E.C. Treaties' embrace of horizontal judicial review is nevertheless entirely understandable, and arguably indispensable, from
a constitutional point of view. Precisely because the Commission
and Council enjoyed such broad and democratically uncontrolled
authority under the Treaties, the rule of law requires some form of
check on their exercise of power. 34 Viewed in this light, judicial
review of the legality of E.U. law measures-though by no means
itself a directly democratic instrument-contributes significantly to
the control of supranational institutions which, for all their power,
are not themselves essentially democratic.
The only real alternatives to inviting the ECJ to perform this role
would have been to permit the legality of Community legislation to
pass unreviewed or to subject it to review by national supreme and
constitutional courts, insofar as its applicability in the various member states is concerned. The first solution, circumventing any judicial review of Community legislation, would have been
unacceptable. The Member States had not perfected their own
internal systems of administrative and constitutional review of
national law over the years-constructing and deploying powerful
notions such as the German Grundrechteand the French principes
generaux du droit-only to permit supranational law to operate,
unreviewed and unreviewable, within their territory. 3 5 A number
of national supreme and constitutional courts-starting with the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. art. 251 (parliamentary co-decision procedure).
Id. arts. 211-19.
Id. arts. 202-10.
Case 294/83, Parti 6cologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 203.
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German 36 and, more recently, the Irish 37 Italian, 3 8 Danish,3 9 and
Greek 4 0-have sent a clear message that, unless the ECJ conducts
serious constitutional review of E.U. legislative and regulatory measures, national courts will have to review them on the occasion of
implementation. This approach presents evident risks to the uniformity and supremacy of E.U. law, which explains, at least in part,
the ECJ's readiness to police E.U. legislative and regulatory measures, again on both fundamental rights and E.U. competence
grounds, when it otherwise might not have done so. 4' The historical record confirms the very real possibility that national courts
might contest E.U. law on one of two grounds: incompatibility with
fundamental rights norms or exceeding the scope of authority
42
"delegated" to E.U. institutions in the constitutive treaties.
We may ask how the Court's authority to conduct horizontal
judicial review within the EU has been exercised. It is, once again,
largely clear and unsurprising that the ECJ has borrowed, by analogy, practices from the administrative and constitutional jurisprudence of some Member States' national constitutional and/or
supreme courts, including notably the German Constitutional
Court and the French Conseil d'Etat. The ECJ has woven a doctrinally rich fabric drawn from national jurisprudential concepts such
as exces de pouvoir (notably, lack of jurisdiction, 43 procedural due
process, 44 violation of substantive law, 45 and detournement de
47 equality, 48
6
), and general principles of proportionality,
pouvoir'4
36. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir
Getreide und Futterrnittel, Case 2 BvL 52/71, BverfGE [Federal Constitutional Court] 37,
271, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (1974). The second solution-national judicial review-is likewise problematic.
37. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v. Grogan, [1989]
I.R. 753, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689 (1989) (Ire.).
38. S.p.a. Fragd v. Amministrazione delle Finanze, Corte cost., 21 Apr. 1989, n.232, 34
Giur. Cost. 1001, 1990 Foro It. 1 1855 (1989).
39. Case I 361/1997, Carlsen v. Rasmussen, [1998] UfR [Supreme Court] 800, 9.6,
[1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 854, 861-62 (1999) (Den.).
40. Katsarou v. DI.KATSA, 3458/1998 (Greece).
41. Id.
42. CRAIG & DE BtJRCA, supra note 17, at 299-308.
43. See, e.g., Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1-3641 (application to
declare the antitrust agreement between the Commission and the United States void).
44. See, e.g., Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R.
1063.
45. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 170-71.
46. See, e.g., Case 105/75, Giuffrida v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1395.
47. See, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffr Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
48. See, e.g., Case 114/76, Bela-MfhleJosef Bergmann KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH & Co.
KG, 1977 E.C.R. 1211.
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protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, 49 and fundamental public liberties.5 0 As among these sources, the ECJ's
intensity of review varies greatly. The ECJ is quite exacting when it
comes to the E.U. institutions' respect for procedural norms and
for specific limits on their scope of authority, but less so in considering whether the competent institutions respected the substantive
law imposed on them by the Treaties or general principles such as
proportionality and subsidiarity. Indeed, scholars have long noted
that the ECJ tends to exercise measurably greater scrutiny when
examining the proportionality of national measures challenged
within the context of the free movement of goods, persons, services, or capital than it exercises when weighing the legality of E.U.
measures against the general principle of proportionality at the
E.U. level. 5 1
Up to a certain point, ECJ review does operate as a reasonable
surrogate mechanism for national court review. To the extent that
both national and E.U. higher laws protect individual rights and
general principles like proportionality, the tasks that they perform
and the values that they champion in performing those tasks are
broadly congruent. But the congruence is far from perfect. There
remains always the possibility that national and E.U. constitutional
systems will reconcile fundamental rights differently and appear to
clash. For example, the two systems have already created a potential conflict with respect to freedom of expression and the right to
privacy.52
No less important or inescapable, of course, is the possibility that
the ECJ and national courts will take contrasting views and reach
conflicting conclusions about the proper scope of E.U. competences. 53 Perhaps in recognition of that fact, and of its possible
impact on national courts' willingness to trust in the surrogacy of
49.
2321.
50.
51.

See, e.g., Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, 1988 E.C.R.

See, e.g., Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
George A. Bermann, Proportionalityand Subsidiarity, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET: UNPACKING THE PREMISES 75, 75-76 (Catherine Barnard &Joanne Scott
eds., 2002).
52. See Craig T. Smith & Thomas Fetzer, The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of
Justice's Authority: Economic Freedom Versus Human Dignity, COLUM. J. EUR. L. (forthcoming
2004) (discussing the preliminary reference to the Court ofJustice by the German Federal
Administrative Court in the Case C-36/02, OMEGA Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellung-GmbH v. Oberbfirgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, 2002/C 109/40, 2002 OJ. (C
109) 25, 25 (Laserdrome case)).
53. Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419 (Tobacco
Advertising).
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ECJ review on the competences question, the ECJ did finally
address this issue. After some forty years of not once finding a
Community law measure to fall ultra vires the Treaties, the ECJ
ruled in the Tobacco Advertising case that a particular directive had,
at least in part, been enacted in excess of the Union's legislative
authority under the EC Treaty. 54 Interestingly, the ruling, while in
itself an exercise of horizontal judicial review (in that the Court
partially struck down an E.U. legislative measure), achieved the
objectives of vertical judicial review. To the extent that the directive was struck down, Member States' "constitutional" authority
over the matter was vindicated and preserved. In effect, while the
practice of horizontal review was in play because the legality of a
coordinate branch's action was in dispute, the ECJ was in effect
resolving the federalism tensions typical of verticaljudicial review.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, federalism concerns cast a long shadow over judicial
review in the European Union. This is the case not only in the
ECJ's vertical market integration case law, but also in the case law
involving horizontal review, where the real value at stake is protection of the proper sphere of Member State authority within the
E.U. constitutional scheme.
This is not to suggest that E.U. constitutionalism is unique, or
even distinct from U.S. constitutionalism, in this regard. The U.S.
Supreme Court's recent federalism rulings under the Tenth, 55
Eleventh, 56 and Fourteenth5 7 Amendments, as well as the Interstate
Commerce Clause, 58 all entail federal judicial challenges to the
constitutionality of legislation adopted by Congress, a coordinate
branch at the federal level. A moment's reflection demonstrates
that the real stakes in those cases involved the balance of constitutional authority between the federal government and the states.
The fact remains that there is still largely missing in the European Union any consensus, such as the consensus which has long
prevailed in the United States, that Member State constitutional
values must, as a matter of substantive principle, yield to national
constitutional values to the extent of conflict between them. Additionally, there is not even any E.U. consensus over the institutional
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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question as to which court-the supreme or constitutional court of
the participating Member State or the European Union's own
supreme court-is the final arbiter on any such substantive questions of law. This is but a sign of the larger unresolved question of
the European Union's identity: is it more in the nature of federal
polity or a federation of polities? Were that question to be clearly
resolved one way or the other, a resolution of the substantive and
institutional tensions to which I refer would more easily emerge.

